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Liburkina L. M.

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Mechanisms for Detecting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Commercial Transactions
Panasenko H. O.

Panasenko, Hanna O. (2026) “Mechanisms for Detecting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Commercial Transactions.” Business Inform 9:748–748.

Section: Finance, Money Circulation and Credit

Article is written in English
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UDC 343.352:339.9

Abstract:
A significant proportion of contemporary publications is devoted to the general economic losses caused by the shadow sector, while the specific nature of combating cross-border bribery at the corporate level remains outside the focus of researchers. In addition, there is a lack of thorough studies explaining how to act in situations where public officials and senior management of transnational companies are involved in illegal schemes, as a result of which standard compliance and verification procedures do not allow for achieving a high level of effectiveness. The aim of the study is to systematize modern tools for detecting hidden corruption in international commercial agreements, assess their efficiency within the corporate control system, and develop a conceptual multilevel model for detecting transnational bribery. The study employs a set of general scientific and special methods, including analysis and synthesis to examine the theoretical foundations of detecting hidden corruption; comparative analysis to assess the efficiency of various detection channels; a system-structural approach to develop a multilevel model; and a statistical method for processing empirical data. The study found that isolated anti-bribery instruments (for example, exclusively internal audit or only monitoring by tax authorities) are unable to ensure reliable protection of the global market. In response to these challenges, the author proposes a monitoring model consisting of four consecutive stages. It provides for the gradual flow of information from internal company inspections to the involvement of financial intelligence units, law enforcement agencies, and institutions of international legal assistance. According to the model, all collected data should be accumulated in a single analytical center to establish a reliable evidentiary basis and identify the ultimate beneficiaries of corrupt financial flows. The results of the study demonstrate the urgent need to abandon the fragmented application of anti-corruption instruments in favor of creating a comprehensive monitoring ecosystem. The model proposed in the article can be directly used as a prototype of regulations for cooperation between the private sector and supervisory authorities. Owing to the developed feedback mechanism, conclusions drawn from identified violations can be promptly integrated into updated company policies, which will significantly minimize the risks of repeated incidents and strengthen the overall anti-corruption resilience of international trade relations.

Keywords: transnational bribery; public officials; international commercial agreements; corporate control; compliance.

Fig.: 2. Tabl.: 1. Bibl.: 18.

Panasenko Hanna O. – Doctor of Sciences (Economics), Associate Professor, Professor, Department of Financial Investigations and Economic Security, Educational and Research Institute of Economic Security and Customs Affairs of the State Tax University (31 Universytetska Str., Irpin, Kyiv region, 08201, Ukraine)
Email: [email protected]

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