

UDC 330.34:338.24(477):338.1(100)  
JEL Classification: E60; F43; O11; O21  
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.32983/2222-4459-2025-2-64-75>

## DETERMINANTS OF ADAPTIVE USE OF THE WORLD EXPERIENCE OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN UKRAINE

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**Vlasiuk O. S., Ilyash O. I., Shevchuk O. A., Roshchyna N. V., Kolishenko R. O.**  
**Determinants of Adaptive Use of the World Experience of Post-War Reconstruction  
and Economic Growth in Ukraine**

*The purpose of the article is to analyze the world experience of post-war recovery and its adaptation to the conditions of Ukraine, in particular, to identify key principles, mechanisms and strategies aimed at ensuring sustainable economic growth, integration into European structures and increasing the country's competitiveness. The author analyzes the world experience of post-war reconstruction and economic growth, as well as the possibility of its application in the Ukrainian socioeconomic and geopolitical context. The importance of applying international best practices to minimize risks, avoid mistakes, and develop effective organizational and economic tools for the country's recovery is emphasized. The importance of attracting international experience, identifying key areas for the development of priority sectors of the economy and balancing national economic development with the needs of the defense industry is emphasized. Special attention is paid to Ukraine's integration into the world economic system, in particular through Euro-Atlantic integration. Three key determinants of effective post-war recovery are identified: attracting external capital, improving the efficiency of domestic economic policy, and ensuring post-war stability. The author analyzes examples of post-war recovery, including the Marshall Plan, Japan, Israel, South Korea, and the Balkan countries. Recommendations for Ukraine are provided, in particular, on the implementation of anti-corruption mechanisms, creation of a favorable investment climate, migrant return policy and increased transparency of government.*

**Keywords:** post-war recovery, economic growth, international experience, integration, anti-corruption mechanisms, investment climate, reintegration of territories.

**Fig.:** 2. **Bibl.:** 14.

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УДК 330.34:338.24(477):338.1(100)

JEL Classification: E60; F43; O11; O21

**Власюк О. С., Іляш О. І., Шевчук О. А., Рощина Н. В., Коліщенко Р. О. Детермінанти адаптивного використання  
світового досвіду повоєнної відбудови та економічного зростання в Україні**

*Метою статті є аналіз світового досвіду повоєнного відновлення та його адаптація до умов України, зокрема визначення ключових принципів, механізмів та стратегій, спрямованих на забезпечення сталого економічного зростання, інтеграції в європейські структури та підвищення конкурентоспроможності країни. Проведено аналіз світового досвіду повоєнної відбудови та економічного зростання, а також можливості його застосування в умовах українського соціально-економічного та геополітичного контексту. Підкреслено значущість застосування передового міжнародного досвіду для мінімізації ризиків, уникнення помилок і розроблення ефективних організаційно-економічних інструментів для*

відновлення країни. Наголошено на важливості залучення міжнародного досвіду, визначення ключових напрямів розвитку пріоритетних галузей економіки та збалансування національного економічного розвитку з потребами оборонно-промислового комплексу. Особливу увагу приділено інтеграції України у світові економічні системи, зокрема через євроатлантичну інтеграцію. Визначено три ключові детермінанти ефективного повоєнного відновлення: залучення зовнішнього капіталу, підвищення ефективності внутрішньої економічної політики та забезпечення повоєнної стабільності. Представлено аналіз прикладів повоєнного відновлення (зокрема плану Маршалла) Японії, Ізраїлю, Південної Кореї та країн Балканського регіону. Надано рекомендації для України, зокрема щодо впровадження антикорупційних механізмів, створення сприятливого інвестиційного клімату, політики повернення мігрантів та підвищення прозорості функціонування органів влади.

**Ключові слова:** повоєнне відновлення, економічне зростання, міжнародний досвід, інтеграція, антикорупційні механізми, інвестиційний клімат, реінтеграція територій.

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Since 2014, and especially since the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has faced the largest humanitarian and economic crisis in Europe since World War II. The widespread destruction of infrastructure, massive population migration, disruption of economic ties, and acute shortage of resources have created unprecedented challenges for the national economy.

It is worth noting that the experience of other countries shows that post-war recovery is based on three main factors: attracting external assistance as an important catalyst for economic recovery; effective domestic reforms that create favorable conditions for business and investment; and stability of the post-war period as a basis for long-term sustainable development goals. At the same time, unlike classical models, when recovery began after the end of hostilities, Ukraine has to launch the reconstruction process in parallel with ensuring defense capability, using existing governance mechanisms to quickly implement changes.

At the same time, our country is facing not only the consequences of large-scale destruction, but also systemic challenges such as corruption and ineffective governance. In addition, Ukraine's strategic orienta-

tion towards integration with the European Union and expansion of international economic partnerships requires compliance with global economic standards, which in turn requires evidence-based approaches to post-war recovery and economic growth strategies based on the integration of best international practices with national development priorities.

Thus, **the aim of the article** is to identify the scientific and methodological determinants of adaptive use of the world experience of modern models of post-war reconstruction and economic growth in Ukraine taking into account the challenges of the current Russian military aggression.

The post-war recovery of Ukraine's economy is the subject of active scientific discussion, as this process requires taking into account international experience and adapting it to the national context. For example, A. Duca (2023) emphasizes that the experience of Japan's post-war reconstruction can become the basis for the formation of a strategy for Ukraine's recovery after the victory, since the right choice of strategic directions reflects the trajectory of future positive changes [7]. M. Trofimchuk (2022) draws attention to the essence, features and approaches to

the implementation of the Marshall Plan for the restoration of Ukraine's economy and infrastructure [5]. A. Kostrubitska's study (2022) focuses on the managerial aspect of the post-war reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the mistakes made during their implementation [12]. T. Bodnarchuk (2022) substantiates the role of foreign trade policy as a key tool for the post-war recovery of European economies under the Marshall Plan, highlighting the importance of State support, integration into the international market and the use of customs and non-tariff instruments to ensure economic recovery and competitiveness [2].

The same opinion is shared by Y. Zheleznyak (2022), E. Chebotarev, B. Glinkovska-Krause (2023), who consider the instruments of the state policy of post-war reconstruction (PWR) of Ukraine, with an emphasis on generalizing world experience, in particular the Marshall Plan, the Dodge Line Program and other historical examples, which makes it possible to identify key principles, mechanisms and commitments for effective economic recovery, integration into European structures and ensuring sustainable development of Ukraine [11, p. 8]. O. Markushyn (2023) notes the importance of analyzing foreign experience in rebuilding war-damaged infrastructure, in particular the experience of West Germany, Israel, Italy, South Korea, and Japan, to use its best practices in the post-war recovery of Ukraine, with a focus on economic liberalization, job creation, export orientation, innovation, and strategic planning, starting with the restoration of key infrastructure facilities [9]. A. Kondratieva (2022) draws attention to the State of organization of management of the development of territories during the military operations in Ukraine at the local, regional and State levels [10].

H. Gorin (2022) focuses on the experience of Croatia's post-war recovery, in particular the process of peaceful reintegration of territories, the role of international organizations, the model of reconstruction of the occupied territories, institutional and financial mechanisms to support the return of refugees and the intensification of economic activity, as well as the stages of public administration reform, constitutional and administrative-territorial reforms, democratization of power, economic liberalization, modernization of law enforcement, judicial and anti-corruption systems, which contributed to economic growth, European integration.

At the same time, insufficient attention is paid to a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the global experience of post-war recovery, national peculiarities of Ukraine and mechanisms for adapting these practices to modern conditions. Therefore, the purpose of the study is to analyze the global

experience of post-war recovery and its adaptation to the conditions of Ukraine, in particular, to identify key principles, mechanisms and strategies aimed at ensuring sustainable economic growth, integration into European structures and increasing the country's competitiveness.

The study of the best practices of the world experience of post-war reconstruction and economic growth is also advisable in view of the following:

- 1) studying the possibilities of involving foreign specialists in addressing structural problems of national economic development and mobilizing resource potential in the segment of overcoming the destructive impact of military operations on Ukrainian territory;
- 2) the appropriateness of selecting strategic points for scaling economic activity and ensuring economic growth in the context of focusing on the most priority sectors and types of economic activity in the post-war period of State development;
- 3) assessing the degree of similarity between foreign conditions of post-war recovery and economic growth and the domestic parameters of functioning of production and economic complexes of the national economy;
- 4) the need to align priority areas of development of the national economy's sectors with its military-industrial complex in the context of adequately responding to existing military threats, maintaining an appropriate level of military potential, and forming sufficient reserves of high-tech weaponry;
- 5) the continuous process of integrating the national economy into the system of global inter-economic relationships, Ukraine's unwavering Euro-integration development vector, and its further accession to NATO as a strategic security priority for the state's functioning;
- 6) the need to adjust advanced global experience in post-war recovery and economic growth, taking into account domestic resource capabilities and economic conditions;
- 7) the possibility of systemic modeling of the national economy's development over the long term based on a pre-established set of military, economic, and technological parameters.

It is worth noting that in the process of studying the world experience of post-war recovery and economic growth, it is critically important to take into account the specifics of the large-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which is formalized in the following: first, in terms of scale, it is the largest war since the Second World War, in

which almost all types of available weapons are used; second, the geographical location of Ukraine and the length of the State border with the aggressor country will constantly create unnecessary risks for the development of the State and the functioning of the national economy; third, military operations on Ukraine's territory have led to one of the most significant migration processes of the population abroad, exacerbating the demographic crisis and challenges of demographic reproduction; fourth, the significant superiority of the aggressor country's military and resource potential compared to Ukraine's resource capabilities; fifth, the large-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine has spurred the formation of unprecedented coalition support for the latter, both in military and economic spheres, from leading Western countries, which also declare their intention to continue providing such support after the war ends, which will evidently be capable of accelerating the pace of Ukraine's post-war recovery.

The results of the study show that the existing global experience of post-war reconstruction and economic growth is differentiated depending on a number of circumstances, including the scale and nature of hostilities; the extent of physical destruction and socioeconomic losses caused by the war; the sociopolitical system and position of the ruling elites of a particular State in the post-war period of economic recovery; financial and economic support of the countries affected by the war by major international institutions (the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, European Union) and key states that are influential players on the international geopolitical stage, impacting the adoption of global governance decisions that determine the parameters of geopolitics and the distribution of spheres of influence on a global scale; the conditions of signed peace agreements and the level of satisfaction of the interests of the parties involved in the armed conflict; the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on the aggressor country; the nature of socioeconomic transformation processes; and the parameters of the political system and public opinion formation among the population of the aggressor state.

Thus, the analysis of the world experience of post-war reconstruction and economic growth shows that the effectiveness of these processes depends on the following three basic determinants: first, the ability to attract capital and resources for reconstruction processes from outside for countries affected by hostilities, which depends on the level of established diplomatic relations, the effectiveness of foreign policy, the ability to form international coalition support; second, the effectiveness of the State's domestic economic policy,

openness to systemic reforms and structural socioeconomic transformations, its ability to mobilize the country's resource potential during the period of post-war recovery, and its capacity to identify basic growth points of the national economy and assign them the role of a locomotive in establishing processes of expanded reproduction; the third determinant of the effectiveness of post-war reconstruction and economic growth directly depends on the conditions of the war's conclusion and the likelihood of renewed hostilities in the medium and long term, which determines not only the efficiency of economic resource use but also the incentives for human capital to participate in the post-war reconstruction process and to build life strategies tied to living in the country.

Among the most extensive historical examples of the world's experience of post-war reconstruction and economic growth, it is quite logical to single out the Marshall Plan (translated from English as "European Recovery Program"), which provided for the post-war recovery of European countries that suffered from hostilities during Second World War (1939–1945). This plan for the recovery of post-war Europe was proposed by US Secretary of State J. K. Marshall in 1947 and provided for the provision of systematic assistance to EU in the process of post-war reconstruction and stimulation of economic growth after the destruction caused by hostilities during Second World War.

In general, under the terms of the Marshall Plan, the United States allocated about 12.4 billion US dollars to support the reconstruction processes in Europe between 1948 and 1952, which at that time corresponded to an approximate equivalent of 120 billion US dollars today. In turn, the US financial support for the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Europe amounted to 17 billion US dollars. It is important to note that more than 90% of these financial and economic resources were provided on a competitive grant basis, which undoubtedly increased the efficiency of the use of the allocated funds. In turn, about 10% of the financial resources were provided in the form of long-term loans for a period of up to 35 years with an interest rate of 2.5% per annum and a simultaneous postponement of the start of payments for the use of credit resources until 1952. As a result, by 1950, the level of industrial production in the countries receiving financial and economic assistance under the Marshall Plan increased by 25% compared to the period of 1938. In turn, agricultural production increased by about 30 % compared to 1938, while the trade deficit decreased from 8.5 billion US dollars to 1 billion US dollars, respectively [1, p. 19].

In the European countries that participated in the Marshall Plan, the problems of trade and balance



of payments deficits became more acute after World War II against the background of falling domestic consumer demand and complicated processes of restoring the production and economic complexes of national economies. Overcoming these problems required an adequate intensification of foreign trade activities in the context of searching for new markets, both for raw materials and for sales of manufactured products, goods and services, based on the construction of new logistics flows and routes that were destroyed during the hostilities. At the same time, the development of foreign trade activities of the Marshall Plan countries in the post-war period was complicated by the following aspects: the presence of structural dependence on imports of production and consumer goods; low rates of recovery of production and economic capacities and, above all, export-oriented industries of the countries participating in the Marshall Plan, due to objective reasons; increasing the level of currency dependence of the countries participating in the Marshall Plan, because, if in the pre-war period more than 75 % of European imports were covered by exports, in the period after World War II this coverage was carried out by financial assistance resources under the Plan [2, p. 121–122].

At the same time, scholars in their studies identify such critical areas of support within the Marshall Plan for its participating countries in the post-war period as the provision of humanitarian assistance to maintain an adequate standard of living for the population affected by hostilities; financing the restoration of critical life support systems, assistance in building institutional infrastructure and implementing systemic reforms in the field of socioeconomic transformation; support for the development of strategically important sectors of the national economy; financing measures for the innovative modernization of critical and socioeconomic infrastructure facilities; ensuring the rational geographical redistribution of heavy industry facilities; and ensuring monetary stabilization of the financial-economic sector of the economy [3, p. 6–7].

The process of allocating financial and economic resources under the Marshall Plan required building an appropriate institutional infrastructure for its administration. To this end, a special institution was created, the so-called Economic Cooperation Administration, which functioned objectively under the jurisdiction of the United States and was accountable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce. In its turn, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OECD) was assigned the role of managing financial funds, while such an institution as the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)

performed the function of controlling the movement of material assets (goods, products, etc.). The technology of utilizing the financial resources allocated under the Marshall Plan included two strategic vectors: the first was to finance import purchases, mainly from the United States, given its resource capacity to meet existing needs and demand; the second was to create so-called “counter funds” in the national currencies of the recipient countries of American funds. These funds were filled with payments in national currency for imported goods and products and were used to provide loans to local entrepreneurs. Based on the established regulations, 40% of the financial resources were used to stabilize currency quotes and invest in non-industrial projects, and 60% were to be used to develop industrial sectors, which laid the foundation for further economic recovery in European countries. At the same time, assistance under the Marshall Plan also provided funding for the transfer of American experience in the management of industrial and economic complexes, which created the preconditions for increasing labor productivity [4, p. 14–15].

The amount of aid allocated to the Marshall Plan recipient countries was differentiated not only by their critical needs due to the destruction caused by the war, but also by the level of economic relations with the United States. In particular, the Netherlands had an urgent need to support the financing of the repair of transport infrastructure (ports, roads, bridges, etc.). In turn, the United Kingdom and France, which suffered the largest losses as a result of the hostilities, received 24% and 21% of the allocated aid, respectively. It should be noted that the amount of funding was significantly differentiated: for example, Iceland received 29 million US dollars, while the UK received almost 3.2 billion US dollars [179, p. 248]. The implementation of the Marshall Plan in post-war Europe created the preconditions for the reconstruction and economic growth of its recipient countries. In particular, France and Italy were able to stabilize the rate of GDP decline and ensure economic growth of their national economies in the period of 1948–1952. In fact, these countries managed to achieve higher GDP growth rates compared to the pre-war period [5, p. 248].

Thus, in particular, it can be argued that the high rates of economic growth in West Germany were also due to the low comparative base for analysis. At the same time, it should be noted that after the end of World War II, West Germany's GDP declined to 160 billion US dollars, while in 1955 the economic growth rate reached the pre-war level, namely 400 billion US dollars. In turn, industrial production increased almost fourfold, and GDP growth averaged 8% annually [6].

It can be noted that the nature of the economic effect of the Marshall Plan in post-war Europe was not only US funding, but also the creation of a multiplier effect due to the end of hostilities and the recovery of national economies in Europe. The financial and economic resources allocated under the Marshall Plan gave a structural impetus to post-war reconstruction and the establishment of economic growth processes based on the principles of expanded reproduction. The study of the existing experience of implementing the Marshall Plan in post-war Europe allows us to draw the following conclusions for Ukraine:


- 1) the prerequisites for organizing large-scale post-war reconstruction and economic recovery were formed only after the complete end of hostilities, which is not fully acceptable in the context of domestic realities, since the recovery processes require immediate and proper financial and economic support, first of all, in the de-occupied territories and places that have suffered devastating blows due to air attacks by the aggressor country (critical infrastructure, civilian buildings, etc.) in order to reintegrate their resource capacities into the processes of functioning;
- 2) the main donor of financial and economic resources under the Marshall Plan in post-war Europe was the United States, while Ukraine can also count on funding from the free world countries that form the international coalition support (the European Union, Japan, Canada and other countries), which certainly increases the potential resource reserves for post-war reconstruction and economic growth after the end of hostilities on the territory of Ukraine;
- 3) financial and economic support for the post-war reconstruction of European countries and ensuring their economic recovery was mainly provided in the form of grant assistance, which requires, at the present stage, improving the skills, abilities and competencies of employees of the State authorities, local governments and the public sector to raise funds on such principles and to use them rationally;
- 4) the process of utilizing financial and economic funds in support of the Marshall Plan for post-war reconstruction was subject to strict monitoring, including by specially formed US institutions, which objectively requires the implementation of effective tools and mechanisms to combat corruption in Ukraine at all hierarchical levels of national economic management;
- 5) effective post-war reconstruction and ensuring the multiplier effect of economic growth

requires the implementation of unpopular structural reforms of the national economy, and martial law is the best period for such implementation, as there is virtually no protest activity and resistance to change among the population, and at the same time, all branches of government are operating normally and are able to perform the functions assigned to them by the Constitution of Ukraine (the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the judiciary).

*Japan's experience.* In addition, it is worth exploring the experience of post-war reconstruction in Japan, which was the aggressor in World War II and was actually limited in the reconstruction process by its own resource capacities, compared to European countries. Post-war Japan faced structural problems in the functioning of its national economy, including large-scale destruction of infrastructure facilities, cities, plants and factories, as the country was even exposed to the challenges of a nuclear strike; high rates of inflation, acute shortages of materials and foods and structural unemployment among the population complicated the processes of economic recovery in the country; the need to democratize and liberalize economic processes and the sociopolitical system of Japan, which required a systematic institutional reforms and a shift in the population's mindset toward economic growth during Japan's post-war reconstruction period (Fig. 1).

In general, Japan's post-war recovery policy was based on the provisions of the so-called "Dodge Line", which provided for the implementation of indicative planning tools, minimization of costs for the military-industrial complex, and the use of the peculiarities of the Japanese business and organizational culture to strengthen the competitive advantages of the national economy in international markets. All this together ensured the elimination of industrial cartels, tax and agricultural reforms, and the implementation of systemic changes in the budgetary sphere of Japan [8, p. 138].

*Israel's experience.* Israel's experience in post-war reconstruction and virtually continuous warfare is also valuable. The territory of the State of Israel was practically destroyed by the fighting during the so-called "War of Independence" (1948–1965). As a result of the hostilities, agriculture was able to cover only 50% of the population's food needs, while export revenues covered no more than 30% of import costs. In turn, the cost of maintaining Israel's military forces reached 40% of the State's total expenditures. Israel was actively working to diversify sources of attracting financial and economic resources to the country's economy from outside. In particular, it managed to attract loans



**Fig. 1. Japan's post-war recovery policy tools**

**Source:** compiled by [7, p. 64–65].

and grants from the United States, use the instruments of issuing government bonds, and get West Germany to pay reparations in the amount of 112 billion US dollars in terms of the current equivalent. It is worth noting that the reparations received formed a powerful impetus for economic growth, as in the period 1952–1965 they accounted for about 55% of the country's additional budget revenues. In the early 50s of the twentieth century, Israel began to implement the New Economic Policy, which provided for the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects that were supposed to provide a structural impetus to the development of the national economy. In particular, the National Israeli Water Supply System was built (the project cost about 420 million Israeli liras), as well as numerous power plants and ports. Large-scale investments were made in agriculture and light industry. In turn, two wars, namely the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973), gave a significant impetus to the development of Israel's military-industrial complex. This sector of the economy has become systemically important in creating jobs and the main source of the country's export revenues. During the period 1954–1964, Israel's GDP showed an average annual growth rate of 10%, consumption in the country increased by about 2.2 times, while unemployment reached almost zero [9, p. 118].

Israel's experience in ensuring economic growth in the context of hostilities is particularly important for Ukraine, given the lack of prerequisites for ending the war with the Russian Federation in the short term. The fundamental basis for the development of the national economy and ensuring economic growth in Israel is its systemic innovation policy. The effect of economic development on an innovative basis allows Israel to compensate for the limited resource potential, given the small size of the country and the actual absence of large reserves of valuable natural resources. An effective combination of national security systems, scientific and technological progress, educational environment and resource capabilities of private capital provided a breakthrough in the development of innovations, creation of military technologies and high value-added products in Israel. The fundamental basis for the implementation of innovation policy in the country is development of intellectual capital and support of scientific talents; financing of the education system, which is the main environment for producing innovations; ensuring innovative orientation of development in the context of each sector of the national economy; development of the military-industrial complex and industrial production, which is a source of development, production and implementation of innovations in both military and civilian life.

**A**mong the main factors that formed the prerequisites for the emergence of Israel as a powerful high-tech competitive country on the world stage are the following: the presence of a constant military threat from neighbors, which requires a continuous process of improving the efficiency of the development of the basic sectors of the national economy; rational combination of opportunities for the development of the military-industrial sector, the scientific environment, the educational system and private capital; the strategic role of public authorities in the development of the innovative orientation of the national economy; the establishment of effective cooperation with the United States and the NATO military bloc, particularly in the areas of technology transfer and financial sector development; and the integration of the diaspora's resource capabilities into the processes of enhancing the competitiveness of Israel's production and economic complexes on global markets [10].

*The experience of South Korea.* It is important to take into account the experience of South Korea in post-war reconstruction and economic growth. After the war, this country was virtually destroyed, and the GDP per capita in 1961 was only 80 US dollars. The country's settlements were not electrified, and all industrial facilities that formed the core of the economy were located in North Korea. The main financial donor for South Korea in the post-war period was the United States. Thus, in the period from 1945 to 1976, the State received more than 12.6 billion US dollars in macro-economic assistance, the lion's share of which was used to restore the network of infrastructure facilities. At the same time, it should be noted that the processes of post-war reconstruction and economic recovery were significantly negatively affected by the high level of corruption, which required tough structural reforms, primarily in the areas of building a network of anti-corruption infrastructure institutions, land relations, and the education system. Against the background of the underdeveloped industrial sector of the national economy of South Korea, the government tried to pursue a policy of import substitution. Thus, as of 1956, the country's exports amounted to 25 million US dollars, while imports were at the level of 389 million US dollars. The trade balance deficit was mainly covered by financial inflows from the United States. Since the mid-1960s, economic relations have been liberalized, which included the use of instruments such as the so-called "tax holidays" and simplification of investment activities, including for foreign capital.

South Korea's economic growth was given a significant boost by the circumstances surrounding the Vietnam War, as the United States placed large-scale military orders for South Korea's military-industrial

complex. In 1967, the country's revenues from military contracts amounted to about 185 million US dollars. This amounted to 4% of the total GDP at that time. Under such circumstances, there was an increase in foreign investment from Japan, and the light industry accounted for more than 70% of export revenues. Since the early 70s of the twentieth century, South Korea's economy has lost its raw material orientation and reoriented itself to innovative high-tech industries, including the chemical industry. Thus, from the 1960s to the 1980s, South Korea maintained a stable growth of the national economy at the level of 8% of GDP, which laid the fundamental basis for its entry into the list of the world's leading economies by 2000 [11].

From a historical perspective, the most recent experience of post-war reconstruction and economic growth that is close to modern realities is that of the Balkan countries that were part of the former Yugoslavia. In this context, the experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina is interesting. According to experts, the losses of this State as a result of hostilities are the most significant. The human losses alone amounted to more than 100 thousand people, which was 2.3% of the total population. The industry was completely destroyed, while the financial losses of the State were estimated at 50–70 billion US dollars. In November 1995, the so-called Dayton Accords were signed, which provided for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to end the Bosnian War. According to this document, the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development undertook to develop a comprehensive program for the post-war reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**T**he program was to focus on building a network of public infrastructure, systemic reform of the financial and economic sector of the economy, institutional reform and local self-government, reconstruction of civilian infrastructure, return of refugees to their homeland, and the development of mechanisms for reintegrating war veterans into civilian life (economic, social, and psychological support). Organizational and managerial support for the process of allocating financial and economic resources was provided by 11 sectoral task forces and a specialized economic group. It should be noted that the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not actively involved in the process of allocating funds. In turn, the activities of the central bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina were subjected to significant strict regulatory procedures, which included the following: during the first six years, the central bank was under external international management; a transitional budget policy was introduced; the International Monetary Fund was involved in the



development of institutional support for the development of the country's financial and economic sector; and the introduction of a new currency. At the same time, despite the end of hostilities and the financial and economic assistance provided, Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been able to successfully complete European integration processes and obtain the status of a member of the European Union, which it declared in its strategic goals [12, p. 44–45].

*Croatia's experience.* In contrast to the experience of post-war reconstruction and economic growth in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the experience of Croatia, which became a member of the European Union on July 1, 2013, is valuable. The country managed to implement structural reforms that laid the institutional and economic foundation for scaling up the national economy. Croatia's losses from the war were estimated at 37 billion US dollars. The policy of post-war reconstruction and economic growth was focused on the reconstruction of destroyed facilities, the return of refugees and the reintegration of territories into the production and economic complexes of the State, which included the following two strategic vectors: first, the intensification of the development of small business entities in the agro-industrial complex, in turn, the second – the resumption of work of existing business entities. An important role in economic growth was played by the program of privatization of the State-owned enterprises and attraction of foreign investment, for which the government created the appropriate conditions. In 2001, the government launched a large-scale decentralization reform, which included the delegation of financial responsibilities and powers to local governments, creating the preconditions for overcoming the imbalances in the country's spatial and regional development.

The public administration reform was focused mainly on increasing efficiency in the field of public administration, improving the quality of administrative services, ensuring transparency and accessibility of public administration, social orientation of the State apparatus, fighting corruption, introducing innovative information and communication technologies, and including State institutions in the system of the common European administrative space [13, p. 175–182]. Accordingly, in Fig. 2 shows the scientific and methodological determinants of the adaptive use of the world experience of post-war reconstruction and economic growth in the domestic economic environment.

Thus, summarizing the global experience of post-war reconstruction and economic growth, we can draw the following conclusions that should be taken into account in the process of its implementation and

adaptive application in the domestic economic environment. Attracting financial and economic resources from outside requires the formation of a strong coalition support, which cannot be trusted without a systematic fight against corruption at all hierarchical levels of national economic management, respect for the rule of law and the principle of inevitability of punishment for corruption crimes.

Economic growth cannot be ensured without a favorable investment climate, including for foreign capital, which requires strict protection of investors' rights through the implementation of mechanisms to guarantee fair trial. It is important to develop a comprehensive policy for the return of external migrants and reintegration of the de-occupied territories on the basis of including their resource potential in the processes of reconstruction and economic growth [14, p.1553–1554].


It is critically important to reduce fiscal pressure on business entities in order to release their financial and economic reserves for innovative modernization of their production and economic business processes and expanded reproduction. It is crucial to ensure pluralism and transparency of public authorities on the basis of building effective mechanisms for their control by non-governmental organizations and the public sector.

## CONCLUSIONS

The results of this study show that the war has a significant impact on the future economic recovery and development of Ukraine. As a result of Russian aggression, there has been large-scale destruction of infrastructure, disruption of economic ties, massive displacement of the population, and an acute shortage of resources, which greatly complicates the post-war reconstruction process and limits the potential for economic growth.

At the same time, the study proves that Ukraine has significant potential to adapt the global experience of post-war recovery, in particular through active support from the international community and domestic efforts to implement reforms, while addressing structural problems such as corruption, ineffective governance, demographic pressure, and insufficient integration between research and production.

In order to overcome these challenges and ensure sustainable economic recovery, the authors propose a methodological framework for Ukraine's economic reconstruction after the war, integrating lessons from global recovery models, taking into account the country's unique socioeconomic and geopolitical context, which includes: attracting external financial



**Fig. 2. Determinants of adaptive use of the world experience of post-war reconstruction and economic growth in Ukraine**

Source: own research.

support through the formation of international coalitions, ensuring transparency in the use of resources and creating effective financial control mechanisms; implementing structural reforms of governance, fighting corruption and creating a favorable investment climate, in particular through economic decentralization and support for local self-government; prioritizing strategic sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, energy and high-tech industries, with an emphasis on innovation and integration into global value chains;

integrating military-industrial development into the overall economic recovery strategy, which will ensure the contribution of national defense to industrial modernization and technological progress; implementing a comprehensive social policy by investing in human capital through reintegration programs for displaced persons, supporting education and retraining, and encouraging the return of qualified specialists; integration into European and global economic structures through acceleration of European integration process-

es, adaptation of the regulatory framework to international standards, and development of international trade. ■

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