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The Purposeful and Ethical Inefficiency of Formal Rules as a Factor in the Spread of Manipulation of Social Sentiment and in Slowing Down the Institutional Reforms
Abramov F. V.

Abramov, Fedir V. (2021) “The Purposeful and Ethical Inefficiency of Formal Rules as a Factor in the Spread of Manipulation of Social Sentiment and in Slowing Down the Institutional Reforms.” Business Inform 6:6–12.
https://doi.org/10.32983/2222-4459-2021-6-6-12

Section: Economic Theory

Article is written in Ukrainian
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UDC 330.1

Abstract:
The article is aimed at identifying criteria for the feasibility of reforming the formal rules with significant purposeful and ethical inefficiency in the context of spreading the practice of manipulation of social sentiment. It is found that in the structure of formal rules with purposeful or ethical inefficiency, two following components can be allocated: basic formal rules adopted to achieve a specific goal; secondary formal rules that should ensure the proper implementation of the relevant basic formal rules and compensate for their inefficiency. In the absence of manipulation of social sentiment, the main factor that causes the negative impact of formal rules with purposeful or ethical inefficiency on the dynamics of formal rules and the effectiveness of institutional reforms is an increase in the number of secondary formal rules. In contrast, in the context of the spread of the practice of manipulation of social sentiment, the main threats to the success of institutional reforms are: significant inverse asymmetry of basic formal rules; the ability of formal rules with purposeful or ethical inefficiency to independently create conditions that are favorable for the manipulation of social sentiment. It is identified that the feasibility of reforming formal rules characterized by purposeful or ethical inefficiency is determined by whether the relevant formal rules have turned into an instrument for manipulation of social sentiment: in cases where ineffective formal rules have become such an instrument, their reform becomes impractical and should be postponed until the practice of manipulation of social sentiment around issues regulated by these formal rules is eliminated. It is shown that in the context of the spread of the practice of manipulation of social sentiment, an additional criterion for the feasibility of reforming ineffective formal rules is the absence of spread of the practice of manipulation of social sentiment into a range of problems regulated by the relevant ineffective formal rules.

Keywords: manipulation of social sentiment, institutional reforms, formal rules.

Bibl.: 25.

Abramov Fedir V. – Candidate of Sciences (Economics), Associate Professor, Associate Professor, Department of General Economic Theory, National Technical University «Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute» (2 Kyrpychova Str., Kharkіv, 61002, Ukraine)
Email: [email protected]

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